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 1 Introduction
When economies adjust to globalization, local resources shift. Workers change jobs and
internal migration ows ensue, depending on the degree of individual mobility. We study
the association between international economic integration and domestic migration using
novel data that comprehensively track individual workers and their employers over time
in Brazil, a leading developing country. Brazil underwent salient eorts to integrate its
economy globally, and simultaneously experienced an acceleration in domestic migration.
Brazil has a long history of high rates of internal migration, similar to many developing
countries. Over the past century, massive ows of internal migrants left states in the North
and Northeast for the growing urban centres in the Southeast and for Bras lia (Library of
Congress 1998). Migration has not subsided. To the contrary, estimates of lifetime interstate
migration rates grew from 20 per cent of the population in 1980 (Martine 1990) to 40 per
cent of the population in 1999 (Fiess and Verner 2002). This migration surge coincides with
market-oriented reforms and Brazil's progressing integration into the global economy since
the late 1980s. Brazil implemented major trade reforms in the early 1990s, trade integration
with its Southern Cone neighbors in 1993, gradual foreign direct investment liberalizations
over the 1990s, and an exchange-rate devaluation in 1999 that facilitated foreign market
access for exporters. The total stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil, for
instance, stood at US$115.5 billion in 1995. Within ve years, this stock more than
quintupled following Brazil's trade and capital-account liberalizations and macroeconomic
stabilization (Rodrigues 2000). Most foreign investments owed to newly privatized utilities
and services companies so that industries beyond manufacturing were impacted.
We document recent migration patterns across states in Brazil using novel and, in their
scope, internationally unprecedented linked employer-employee data for a developing country.
The data show that one third of the job-changing workers in Brazil's formal sector migrate
across state borders to nd new formal employment every year in the 1990s. Contrary
to long term evidence from household cross-sections, we show that recent annual migration
ows of formal sector workers are directed towards uncommon destinations. Select states in
the Centre-West, North and Northeast receive large ows of formal sector immigrants. This
1stands in contrast to the assertion that the typical migrant ow in Brazil runs from North
to South.
Our data link workers to their employers and are uniquely suited to investigate to what
extent factors related to globalization are associated with observed migration ows. There
is a robust association between globalization-related employer characteristics and formal
sector migration across states. While the majority of workers move between domestic and
non-exporting establishments, there are notable dierences between migrants and stayers in
their exposure to foreign owned and exporting establishments. The average migrant in the
sample is more likely to move to a job at a foreign owned or exporting establishment than
a non-migrant. Job changers to foreign owned establishments benet from a considerably
steeper tenure-wage prole than workers at domestic-owned establishments.
We further investigate these mean sample characteristics in a multivariate analysis that
incorporates the methodology proposed by Dahl (2002) to account for the many destination
choices that a migrant faces. The descriptive results provide additional support for
the idea that globalization acts on internal migration through the growth of employment
opportunities at locations with a high concentration of foreign owned establishments and
the stability of employment at exporting establishments. The importance of the presence of
foreign owned establishments in the immigration region, beyond the spot wage, is consistent
with the economic rationale that migrants can expect benets beyond the spot wage
dierence, such as steeper wage paths at foreign owned establishments or more favourable
overall labour-market conditions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize
the literature on internal migration and discuss recent market-oriented policy reforms in
Brazil. Section 3 describes the data and oers descriptive statistics relating globalization
and cross-state migration in Brazil. Section 4 oers multivariate support for the descriptive
evidence. We introduce the statistical model of the migration decision, paying special
attention to self-selection of migrants, and present estimation results alongside. We conclude
with nal remarks.
2Table 1: Average regional characteristics, 1997-2001
GDP Population Share of value added in Urbani-
per capita (millions) Agriculture Manufact. Services zation
North 2,667 1.9 0.106 0.260 0.634 0.004
Northeast 2,111 5.4 0.094 0.345 0.561 0.031
Southeast 7,507 18.3 0.054 0.416 0.529 0.094
South 6,762 8.5 0.139 0.428 0.433 0.130
Centre-West 7,464 3.0 0.188 0.206 0.606 0.009
Average 4,364 6.4 0.110 0.322 0.568 0.041
Source: IBGE, 1997-2001.
2 Internal migration and policy reforms
Considerable economic disparities persist between Brazil's ve regions. As Table 1 shows,
per capita GDP in the Southern regions (South and Southeast) is more than triple the per
capita GDP level in the Northern regions (North and Northeast).1 Even within regions,
incomes between Brazil's 27 states dier. These regional disparities oer incentives for
migration. Brazil's population in 2001 was approximately 176 million, with around half (85
million) actively participating in the labour force (World Bank 2005). The International
Labour Organization estimates that 66 per cent of the labour force held a formal sector job
in 1997 (Meier and Rauch 2005). Our data cover the formal sector.
2.1 Internal migration
Historically, migrants in Brazil moved to cities where import-substituting industries
ourished and away from the rural interior that underwent agricultural modernization
(Martine 1990). Declining agricultural prices contributed to rural displacement, and
migration to the coastal cities accompanied Brazil's industrialization process and urban
growth (Yap 1976, Graham 1970). The combination of rising wages in the industrial South
and declining wages in the rural North accelerated the ight from rural areas over the decades.
Using data from the Brazilian decennial censuses, Martine (1990) reports that the number
1The high average GDP per capita in the Centre-West region is misleading, as the capital city in the
Distrito Federal (DF) largely drives the results (the median per capita GDP for the region is only $5,925).
Per capita GDP in the Distrito Federal is the highest in the country (US$13,604), compared to only US$4,403
in the neighboting state of Goias (GO).
3of Brazilians residing in a state other than the state of birth was 3.5 million in 1940 (or 9 per
cent of the population). This share increases steadily until 1980, when close to 20 per cent
of the population reside outside their state of birth.2 Migration accelerates further during
the last two decades of the 20th century and results in a doubling of the migrant population
share (with the primary residence outside the birth state) to 40 per cent by 1999 (Fiess and
Verner 2002).
Research into determinants of internal migration can be classied into two broad
categories: research that concentrates on migrant characteristics, and research that
concentrates on regional characteristics and dierentials as primary determinants. Early
studies on Brazil, such as Sahota (1968), Graham (1970) and Yap (1976), related internal
migration to regional and sectoral wage and income dierences. In a recent study, Fiess
and Verner (2002) place primary attention on migrant and stayer characteristics. Fiess
and Verner nd that migrants from the Northeast to the Southeast face strong economic
incentives for migration, while migrants from the Southeast region to the Northeast region
confront lower estimated returns to migration, suggesting other non-pecuniary factors may
play a relatively larger role.
Lacking information on employer-level, or municipality-level, exposure to international
markets, prior research largely neglects the role of market-oriented reforms and globalization
for internal migration ows. The main purpose of this chapter is to uncover the relationship
between formal sector migration and economic reform, as promoted through Brazil's trade,
investment and macroeconomic policy shifts. We control for wage dierentials and self-
selection of migrants, using a one per cent random sample of the national workforce, and
identify the workers' annual state-to-state migrations between 1997 and 2001. While
much of the previous work identies single migration decisions from a cross section of
workers, drawing on decennial censuses or household surveys, the depth of our novel matched
employer-employee data set allows us to identify worker mobility at the annual horizon and to
incorporate employer-level information on exposure to global markets. Contrary to worker
cross sections, where worker characteristics are typically only measured at a single time
2Graham (1970), Martine (1990) and Schmertmann (1992) provide a detailed history of the Brazilian
migration experience.
4after migration, we can draw on worker, employer, and location information before and after
migration. Lacking information on informal workers, however, our results can only represent
migration ows within the formal sector.
Prior research shows that chief among the migration determinants are migrant characteristics
such as age, sex, educational attainment, as well as regional characteristics like per capita
income dierentials and urbanization rates. Beyond those covariates, we include factors
related to globalization at the migrant level|employment in a multinational enterprise and
employment in an exporting establishment|and control for state-level information on the
share of foreign owned and exporting establishments as factors in the migration decision.
Our data do not include family variables like marital status or the number of children,
however, which prior research has shown to be associated with migration. Inasmuch as
family variables are related to prior workforce experience, which we observe at the individual
level, we can control for their impact on migration selection.
2.2 Brazil's policy reforms
Brazil oers a particularly appropriate setting to study the association between globalization
and internal formal sector migration because salient liberalizing policy reforms occurred over
a short period of time. The marked time variation, and dierential regional responses
to Brazil's large-scale national reforms, allow us to discern the eects of globalization on
internal migration from other simultaneous but more gradual economic changes. Figure 1
illustrates the considerable increases in FDI inows and exports as a percentage of GDP for
the Brazilian economy between 1995 and 2001 (World Bank 2005). These notable changes
followed trade liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization policies, which helped bring
down ination levels and opened the Brazilian market to international competition.
Average tari rates fell from 41 per cent to 18 per cent between 1988 and 1989. In
the early 1990s, Brazil abolished the remaining non-tari barriers inherited from the import
substitution industrialization era (Averbug 2000), brought nominal taris further down to
below 15 per cent, and formed the free trade area Mercosul with its Southern Cone neighbots
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil's entry into Mercosul in 1991 was instrumental
in attracting inows of FDI to the country as a regional export base for multinational
5Figure 1: Foreign direct investment inows and exports, 1990-2001
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rms (Pineiro and Moreira 2000). After decades of ination and several unsuccessful
stabilization attempts, the Brazilian government succeeded with its erce macroeconomic
stabilization plan Plano Real in 1994 and lastingly ended hyperination. These reforms put
Brazil's economy on a pro-competitive basis and precede our sample period 1996-2001. It is
mainly during the second half of the 1990s that the Brazilian economy exhibits heightened
capital inows and exporting activity (Figure 1). We hypothesize that Brazil's progressing
integration into the global economy is related to domestic factor reallocations, which in turn
should be associated with formal sector migration ows.
3 Data sources and descriptive statistics
Our main data source are Brazil's administrative records of formal sector workers and their
employers. We combine this worker information with complementary data sources on foreign
and exporting establishments, industries, and state-level characteristics.
3.1 Worker data
The linked employer-employee data come from the Brazilian Labour Ministry (Minist erio
do Trabalho e Emprego) Brazilian Labour Ministry (1996-2001). By law, all registered
establishments are required to report to the ministry on their workers every year. In practice,
only formally-employed workers will be properly reported. This information is collected in
6the data base Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais (RAIS) since 1986. For most of our
analysis, we use information from RAIS for the years 1997 through 2001 when we also have
complementary information. RAIS includes the worker ID (Programa de Integra c~ ao PIS),
similar to a social security number in the United States. Also included in the data are the
tax number of the worker's establishment (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jur dica CNPJ), the
industrial classication of the worker's establishment (Classica c~ ao Nacional de Atividades
Econ^ omicas CNAE) and the municipality of the worker's establishment.3
The main benet of the RAIS database is the ability to track individually identiable
workers over time, across establishments, and across municipalities and states. Brazilian
establishment tax numbers are common across many databases so that RAIS information
can be combined with complementary establishment-level data sources. The RAIS worker
data oer information on annual real wages, tenure at the establishment, gender, age, and
educational attainment.4 RAIS covers establishments in any sector, so workers in the services
and utilities industries, to which much of the foreign investments were directed in the second
half of the 1990s, are included.
We draw a one per cent random sample of the national data and restrict observations as
follows. First, only workers with correct eleven-digit worker IDs are included.5 Following
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), we restrict the set of workers to only those workers
receiving positive wages. Finally, for workers with multiple jobs in a given year, only the
most recent job is included in the sample. If a worker has multiple current jobs, the highest
paying job is included in the sample. This restriction rests on the assumption that workers
most likely rely on the last and highest-paying job of the year in their decision to migrate.
3A worker's ID generally remains with the worker throughout his or her work history. The process
for establishments to report on their workers is extensive and costly. However, RAIS records are used to
administer payment of the annual public wage supplements to every formally-employed worker, thus creating
a strong incentive for workers to urge their employers to report accurately.
4Educational attainment is dened as the level of schooling completed.
5Eleven digits is the traditional length of a PIS number in Brazil. Shorter PIS numbers are defective and
not trackable over time. Firms that enter false identication numbers could be reporting informal workers,
or have faulty bookkeeping.
73.2 Complementary establishment and state data
By law, all foreign investments are registered with Brazil's central bank (Banco Central do
Brasil, BCB) in its Registro Declarat orio Eletr^ onico{Investimentos Externos Diretos (RDE-
IED) (Brazilian Central Bank 1996-2001). The RDE-IED is available from the BCB for
the years 1997 through 2001. We dene an establishment to be (partly) foreign owned
in year t if the establishment received an inow of foreign capital in year t. We note that
establishments receiving inows of foreign capital in year t may maintain foreign relationships
in later years. Therefore, establishments are counted as foreign owned in all years   t after
the initially observed inow at year t.6 Finally, we consider foreign funds at the holding-
company level to aect all establishments of the corporate group. Using BCB information
on the corporate ownership relations among Brazilian rms, we therefore also count an
establishment as foreign owned in year   t if it is a subsidiary of a company receiving
inows of foreign capital in year t. Matching the RDE-IED information to RAIS at the
establishment level, we dene an indicator variable equal to one i a worker holds a job at
a foreign owned establishment. We also compute the share of foreign owned establishments
at the state level.
We use exporter status data from the Brazilian customs oce (Secretaria de Com ercio
Exterior, SECEX) (Brazilian Customs Oce 1996-2001). SECEX maintains an establishment-
level data set consisting of all legally-registered exporting establishments in Brazil with at
least one export transaction in a given year. We match SECEX information from 1997
through 2001 to RAIS and dene an indicator variable equal to one i a worker holds a job
at an establishment with a positive dollar value of free-on-board exports in a given year. We
also compute the share of exporting establishments at the state level.
Figure 2 shows average shares of foreign owned establishments and of exporting
establishments by state between 1997 and 2001, with darker shades reecting higher shares.
Amazonas (AM), in the North, has the highest share of foreign investments, as dened by
6We may miss (partly) foreign owned establishments if there was an initial inow of foreign capital before
our sample period, and no inow during our sample period. Note, however, that retained earnings are inows
under common foreign direct investment denitions so that inows are likely to be observed in every year
of foreign ownership. Missing some (partly) foreign owned establishments moves the odds of detecting a
statistically signicant eect of foreign ownership against us.
8Figure 2: Global integration of Brazilian states, 1997-2001































































Sources: RDE-IED and SECEX, 1997-2001.
the share of foreign owned establishments in the state during the ve year period from 1997
to 2001. This is likely a consequence of Brazil's exports promotion programs and export
processing zones in the Amazon. S~ ao Paulo (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ) states rank second
and third, respectively. The Northeastern states of Tocantins (TO), Sergipe (SE), and Acre
(AC) are the locations with the smallest shares of foreign ownership. The Amazon also
ranks the highest in terms of exporting establishments to total establishments. The state
of Par a (PA), also in the North, has the second highest share of exporting establishments.
Otherwise, exporting establishments are largely concentrated in the Southern regions.
We obtain state-level information on population, GDP per capita, urbanization rates, and
value added in agriculture, manufacturing, and services from the Brazilian census bureau
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geograa e Estat stica (IBGE); see Table 1) Brazilian Census Bureau
(2005). These variables are traditionally reported among the key determinants of the
migration decision.
3.3 Complementary trade data
To reect a Brazilian industry's lagged exposure to global competition, we obtain export and
import information from WTF (World Trade Flow) data for the years 1996-2000 (Feenstra,
Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo 2005); we extract sector-level trade ow statistics by SITC Rev.
92 4-digit product category in current US$ for Brazil's exports and imports, and map the
trade-ow information to the 2-digit CNAE sector level in RAIS (broadly comparable to the
SITC 2-digit level). We then use a state's industry composition from RAIS to calculate
last period's location-specic exposure to foreign trade.
3.4 Migrant and stayer characteristics
The complete linked employer-employee database includes the full employment history of
formal sector workers in Brazil from 1997 through 2001. We dene workers as migrants if
the state of the worker's establishment at time t is dierent from the state of the worker's
establishment at time t + 1. Conversely, if a worker remains in the same state for years t
and t + 1, he is considered a stayer but may switch employers within the same state.
The nal one per cent random sample includes 1,548,131 workers in 339,515 establishments
over the period 1997 through 2001. We use the 1,005,010 individuals who appear in the
data for at least two consecutive time periods to calculate annual migration statistics. The
workers are from any of the 27 states and any sector of the economy. Migrants represent
around 2 per cent of the complete sample (22,837 individuals) in the annual average. Formal
sector migrants are most often from the Centre-West and Northern regions, where 3.9 per
cent and 3.0 per cent of workers are migrants, respectively, while workers in the Southeastern
region are least likely to move between states (2.0 per cent of workers migrate). As a
consequence of annual migration rates around two per cent on average, small dierences in
employment patterns may have a potentially strong impact on migration patterns.
Small annual migration rates can nevertheless be associated with considerable migration
backgrounds in a cross section of households and workers. Suppose a worker's migration
odds are independent of past migration and that a worker migrates only after he has earned
40 years labour force experience. Then an annual migration rate of 2 per cent among formal
sector workers will result in a share of 55 per cent of workers with a migration background
among the cohort just before retirement (1 :9840), and a 33 per cent migration background
for a worker half-way through the active time in the labour force (1   :9820). Little is
known about the odds of repeat migration, and little is known about annual migration rates
among workers outside the formal sector. Yet the notable share of Brazil's population with
10Table 2: Average worker characteristics, 1997-2001
Full Sample Migrants Stayers
Worker characteristics
Primary school 0.563 0.587 0.563
High school 0.303 0.280 0.304
Some college 0.033 0.039 0.033
College graduate 0.101 0.094 0.101
Female 0.372 0.210 0.376
Time-variant characteristics
Age in year t 34.0 31.5 34.1
Log average wages in t 8.08 8.18 8.08
Log average wages in t + 1 8.14 8.19 8.13
Employed in foreign establishment in year t 0.022 0.039 0.022
Employed in foreign establishment in year t + 1 0.028 0.052 0.027
Employed in exporting establishment in year t 0.085 0.081 0.085
Employed in exporting establishment in year t + 1 0.086 0.080 0.086
Number of observations 1,005,010 22,837 982,173
Note: Worker characteristics in the upper panel are largely time invariant except for infrequent advances in educational
attainment after entry into the formal sector labour force.
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample), RDE-IED, and SECEX, 1997-2001.
a cross-state migration background|around 40 per cent by the late 1990s (Fiess and Verner
2002)| suggests that the annual formal sector migration rate of around 2 per cent is perhaps
similar to overall migration rates.
Table 2 contrasts average worker characteristics of migrants and stayers between 1997 and
2001. Though migrants and stayers in our formal sector sample are remarkably similar, there
are a few key dierences. Formal sector migrants are less likely to have a high school degree
and more likely to have only a primary school education than stayers. Meanwhile, migrants
are equally likely to have at least some college education as non-migrants. This highlights an
important dierence between our data on formal sector migration and conventional statistics
on rural-to-urban migration in developing countries. Formal sector migration is relatively
higher-skilled migration. Over 6 per cent of formal sector workers with at least some college
education migrate across state lines at least once during the sample period. In contrast, just
2.4 per cent of formal sector workers with a high school degree migrated during the ve year
period and 2.8 per cent of workers with only a primary school education are migrants.
This pattern exhibits only some regional variation across emigrant region. In any region
11except for the South, workers with at least some college education are more likely than
workers with lower levels of education to migrate; only in the South are workers with at
least some college and workers with a primary or high school education equally likely to
migrate. Formal sector migrants of all education levels are most likely to migrate from the
Centre-West region, consistent with the high total emigration from this state. At the state
level within regions, there is some variability. Workers with only a primary school education,
for instance, are more likely than the highest skilled workers to migrate out of the Northern
states of Roraima and Tocantins, the Northeastern states of Alagoas (AL), Bahia (BA),
Sergipe, and Maranh~ ao (MA), and Rio Grande do Norte (RN), and the Centre-West state,
Mato Grosso (MT). Workers of all levels of education are equally likely to leave S~ ao Paulo
state.
Migrant demographics vary across immigrant states. While migrating workers who arrive
in the Southeast and the Distrito Federal are more likely to be high-skilled, formal sector
workers migrating to the North are more likely to have only a primary school education. The
main exception is the state of the Amazon. Our data indicate that the share of high-skilled
formal sector migrants to the Amazon is greater than the share of low-skilled formal sector
migrants. These high-skilled migrants most frequently travel from within the Northern
region.
Women are less likely to be formal sector migrants. This observation is consistent across
all states and regions. The rates of migration for men and women are most similar in the
Southern region. The average migrant is approximately two years younger than the average
stayer. Youth aged 15-17 are least likely to migrate, while young workers (18-24 years) are
most likely to migrate.
Wages for formal sector migrants, both before and after the migration decision, are higher
than wages for stayers. Before the migration decision, the average migrant earns average
annual wages approximately 10 per cent higher than stayers. The wage dierential falls to 6
per cent after the migration decision. Migration theory based on neoclassical human capital
theory posits that workers search for jobs that oer the highest economic return in expected
future wages. If the expected wage dierential is a main determinant of the migration
decision, the drop in the wage dierential suggests that expectedly steeper or more certain
12future wage paths could be important factors for the migration decision beyond the spot
wage dierential.
3.5 Job changes and migration
Nationwide, between forty per cent and half of all formal sector workers change jobs per year,
as Table 3 shows. In metropolitan areas, however, turnover is considerably smaller than
the nationwide average, with only around one in four metropolitan workers changing jobs.
Transfers of workers within rms but across states are only a minor component of formal
sector migration. Migration is a remarkably important choice for workers with formal sector
job changes (who neither retire nor exit the formal sector). Nationwide, roughly two thirds
of the job-changing workers switch employment within state (the proportion of the same-
state job changers in all job changers), but one third migrate across state borders.7 There
is a slightly less than one-half chance that cross-border job changers move to a metropolitan
area. Two to three in ve workers with a job loss exit the formal sector at the annual horizon.
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) analyze this type of transition using household data.
The focus of the present chapter lies on the migrants with a successful reallocation.
Table 4 tracks the 206,418 workers in our sample who changed jobs over a year between
types of establishments|domestic or foreign owned establishments and non-exporting or
exporting establishments|and oers a more manifest indication that globalization may be
related to internal migration. The overall odds for a worker at a domestic establishment to
change to a multinational enterprise (0.026/0.954 = 0.027) are almost ten times smaller than
for a multinational worker to change to another foreign owned establishment (0.004/0.016 =
0.250). Similarly, the odds for a worker at a non-exporting establishment to change to an
exporter (0.047/0.874 = 0.054) are almost ten times smaller than for a worker at an exporter
to change to another exporter (0.026/0.053 = 0.491).
As a consequence, the bulk of workers move between domestic and non-exporting
establishments. But there are notable dierences between migrants and stayers in their
7The fact that one third of formal sector job switchers are cross-state migrants is of particular importance
to the conduct of repeated household surveys, which invariably classify these households as missing and thus
potentially exaggerate transitions into unemployment.
13Table 3: Job retentions and changes, 1997-2001
National Metropolitan areas
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Job retention
Same location 0.606 0.570 0.526 0.502 0.484 0.728 0.741 0.730 0.759 0.756
Transfer 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
Job changes (frequencies conditional on no retention)
Same state 0.255 0.203 0.176 0.154 0.148 0.468 0.474 0.428 0.487 0.514
Migrate metro 0.051 0.052 0.042 0.044 0.055 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.019
Migrate other 0.075 0.073 0.063 0.060 0.087 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.025
Other changes (frequencies conditional on no retention)
Retire 0.040 0.051 0.060 0.066 0.071 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.034 0.041
Formal exit 0.569 0.611 0.653 0.669 0.633 0.447 0.432 0.480 0.423 0.381
Note: End-years of annual worker continuations and transitions between jobs. Transfers are changes of establishment across
state borders but within rms. Retirements include reported deaths on the job. Formal sector exits are to informal employment,
unemployment, self employment, or out of the labour force.
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample), RDE-IED, and SECEX, 1996-2001.
Table 4: Establishment types and migration, 1997-2001
Full sample Migrants Stayers
Number Share Number Share Number Share
Workers with job change, switching establishment types
domestic to foreign owned 5,422 0.026 733 0.035 4,709 0.025
foreign owned to domestic 3,256 0.016 492 0.024 2,764 0.015
non-exporting to exporting 9,759 0.047 1,027 0.050 8,732 0.047
exporting to non-exporting 11,024 0.053 1,082 0.052 9,942 0.054
Workers with job change, remaining in establishment types
domestic establishments 196,922 0.954 19,381 0.937 177,541 0.956
foreign owned establishments 798 0.004 78 0.004 720 0.004
non-exporting establishments 180,360 0.874 18,243 0.882 162,117 0.873
exporting establishments 5,275 0.026 332 0.016 4,943 0.027
Number of observations 206,418 20,684 185,734
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample), RDE-IED, and SECEX, 1997-2001.
exposure to foreign owned and exporting establishments. Since migration frequencies are
small at the annual horizon, apparently minor dierences can matter for migration outcomes.
Of the 206,418 workers with a job change in our sample, 20,684 (10.0 per cent) migrate
across states. And of these 20,684 migrants, 733 (3.5 per cent) switch into a foreign owned
establishment from a domestic establishment with their cross-state move; 1,027 (5.0 per cent)
14Table 5: Average workforce characteristics, by establishment type, 1997-2001
Full Non-
Sample Foreign Domestic Exporting exporting
Primary school 0.563 0.362 0.568 0.577 0.562
High school 0.303 0.363 0.302 0.303 0.303
Some college 0.033 0.083 0.032 0.040 0.032
College graduate 0.101 0.193 0.099 0.081 0.103
Female 0.372 0.259 0.375 0.243 0.384
Age 34.0 33.5 34.0 32.7 34.1
Number of observations 1,005,010 22,071 982,939 85,677 919,333
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample), RDE-IED, and SECEX, 1997-2001.
of the migrants switch into an exporting establishment from a non-exporting establishment
after migration. Migrants are more likely to move to a job at a foreign owned or exporting
establishment than the average worker: for non-migrants with a job change, the transition
frequencies to a foreign owned or exporting establishment are only 2.5 per cent and 4.7
per cent, respectively. Workers with a job change from an exporter to another exporter are
more likely to be non-migrants (2.7 per cent) than migrants (1.6 per cent), however, possibly
because exporters are regionally clustered.
Employer characteristics. Table 5 shows that workers in foreign owned establishments
are more educated on average than workers in their domestic establishment counterparts.
Almost 20 per cent of workers at a foreign owned establishment are college graduates, while
only 10 per cent of workers at domestic establishments have a college degree. Workers
at foreign owned establishments are on average one-half year younger and less likely to be
female than workers at domestic establishments. Workers in exporting establishments are
also younger and more likely male than workers in non-exporting establishments. However,
workers in exporting establishments are on average less educated. Fifty-eight per cent of
exporting-establishment workers have only a primary school education.
Wage dierentials between current employment and expected future employment are a
widely documented determinant of migration. Exporters and foreign owned establishments
typically pay higher wages, partly because of more skilled workforces (see Table 5) and
partly because of rm-xed eects in compensation (Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey
15Figure 3: Tenure-wage proles, by establishment-type, 1997-2001
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forthcoming). Beyond dierences in spot wages, expected wage proles provide incentives for
job changes and migration. In Figure 3, we graph the average log wage for workers over years
of tenure at the establishment, by establishment type. The tenure-wage prole for foreign
owned establishments is considerably steeper than the tenure-wage prole for domestic-
owned establishments, while there appears to be only a small dierence between the tenure-
wage paths for exporting and non-exporting establishments. In fact, based on evidence from
linear prediction, an additional year of tenure at a non-exporting establishment is associated
with 2.1 per cent higher wages, while an additional year at an exporting establishment relates
to 2.9 per cent higher wages. Meanwhile, an additional year of tenure at a multinational
enterprise predicts a wage increase by more than double the amount at a domestic-owned
establishment (4.5 per cent as compared to 2.1 per cent).
Emigrant and immigrant states. Figure 4 maps the frequency of formal sector
emigration and immigration by state. Formal sector emigrants are most likely to come
from the Northern regions. More than one in twenty workers from Tocantins in the sample
migrate to another state between 1997 and 2001. Over 3 per cent of workers in Sergipe,
Rond^ onia (RO), Roraima (RR) and Amap a (AP) leave for another state. The share of
emigrants in the Centre-West region is similarly high. Close to 5 per cent of workers from
Mato Grosso (MT) and the Distrito Federal are migrants. Emigrants are least likely to
come from states in the South and Southeast. Only 1.5 per cent and 1.7 per cent of workers
in Rio Grande do Sul and S~ ao Paulo, respectively, migrate to another state.
16Figure 4: Emigration and immigration frequencies by state, 1997-2001































































Source: RAIS (one per cent random sample), 1997-2001.
Immigration to the Southeast dominates. Over 15 per cent of the sample workforce head
to the state of S~ ao Paulo, while 6.2 per cent and 5.8 per cent move to Minas Gerais (MG)
and Rio de Janeiro states, respectively. The states of Goias and the Distrito Federal in the
Centre-West, Par a in the North and Bahia in the Northeast, however, also receive relatively
large ows of immigrants. This stands in contrast to the common assertion that the typical
migrant ow in Brazil runs from North to South.
Although a large part of formal sector migration in Brazil is regional, there is substantial
migration from great distances.8 Emigrants from Acre in the North are most likely to move
across the country to the state of Alagoas in the Northeast and migrants in Esp rito Santo
(ES) in the Southeast are most frequently from Alagoas. Not surprisingly, 14 out of 27 states
send the highest shares of migrants to S~ ao Paulo. Meanwhile, among emigrants from S~ ao
Paulo state between 1997 and 2001, almost 70 per cent moved within the South or Southeast,
yet almost 21 per cent migrated to states in the Northern regions, and 13 per cent migrated
to the Centre-West region. Immigrants to the Amazon state are most likely to arrive from
within the North region, but close to 3 per cent of formal sector migrants moving to the
state of Amazonas arrive from the South and Southeast regions.
8For a complete state-to-state transition matrix, please contact the authors.
174 Estimation of the migration decision
Our objective is to relate formal sector migration in Brazil to factors associated with
Brazil's increasing integration into the global economy. In this section, we accumulate
further descriptive evidence, in support of the previous section, using multivariate analysis.
The approach allows us to simultaneously condition on multiple covariates associated with
formal sector migration ows, and to discern their importance as predictors for migration.
We rst treat the self-selection problem inherent in the migration decision, by following a
standard econometric approach in the literature and estimate a maximum likelihood model
of selectivity-corrected wages developed by Heckman (1979). On the basis of these predicted
wages, we follow the methodology proposed by Dahl (2002) and account for the multichoice
decision problem of a migrant.
4.1 Self-selection bias
The neoclassical model of migration views expected utility dierentials as the underlying
forces for migration. Rational individuals optimize expected lifetime utility, given the
expected earnings dierential and costs to migrate. Non-pecuniary factors such as dierences
in regional amenities or land values may also enter the utility function and inuence the
migration decision.
Econometric studies analyzing migration decisions typically depart from a Mincer (1974)
wage regression as follows
Yi = Xi + Mi + Zs + i (1)
where Yi are log wages for individual i, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, Mi is a
binary variable equal to one if the worker migrates, Zs is a vector of characteristics for state
s, and i is the error term.
Estimation of the return to migration based on a comparison of wages (equation (1))
between migrants and stayers may be biased due to self-selection. A correctly specied 
could only be recovered directly if we observed a worker once randomly induced to migrate
and once to stay. Simplifying equation (1),  measures the expected dierence in wage
18outcomes for a worker, conditional on migration, that is
E(jX;Z;M = 1) = E(YmjX;Z;M = 1)   E(YsjX;Z;M = 1)
where E(jX;Z;M = 1) is the conditional expectation function (conditional on migration
and a vector of covariates), and Ym and Ys are wage outcomes for a migrant and a stayer.
The researcher knows the rst element of the term, but it is impossible to observe the second
part of the term|wages of a stayer conditional on the counterfactual circumstance that he
migrates.
Consider the following decomposition of observed outcome variables|wages of migrants
conditional on migration and wages of stayers conditional on staying
E(YmjX;Z;M = 1)   E(YsjX;Z;M = 1) + E(YsjX;Z;M = 1)   E(YsjX;Z;M = 0)
The rst two terms of the expression represent the parameter of interest , while the last two
terms represent the self-selection bias|the dierence in counterfactual outcomes depending
on whether a worker migrates or stays. Self-selection may occur if migrants are selected by
employers in the immigration state on the basis of worker characteristics or if migrants sort
themselves into regions and occupations with the highest expected relative earnings.
4.2 An econometric model of migration with self-selection
Our estimation procedure derives from the Roy (1951) model of self-selection as extended
by Dahl (2002). The approach allows the migration decision and the economic returns from
migration to be determined simultaneously.
Consider the migration decision. An individual chooses to migrate depending on the gains
and costs of migration. Neglecting other regional attributes for a moment, an individual will
migrate if the expected wage dierential from migrating exceeds the associated costs
Ymi   Ysi > Ci
where Ymi and Ysi are wages in the migration state and wages at home (`stayer state'),
19respectively, and Ci are the associated costs of moving. Following the literature, we
suppose that a worker's propensity to migrate depends on a linear combination of the wage
dierentials as well as individual, Xi, and state, Zs, characteristics
Ii = 0 + 1[Ymi   Ysi] + 2Xi + 3Zs + i (2)
As discussed, the econometrician cannot observe outcomes for an individual in both the
migrant state (Ymi) and the stayer state (Ysi). To overcome the self-selection problem, we
rst estimate a maximum likelihood Heckman (1979) selectivity correction. Our baseline
estimation is as follows. The migration selection equation includes worker characteristics
such as gender, age, and educational attainment as well as state-level characteristics such
as urbanization rates, the log of per capita GDP, the log of state-average wages, and state-
level log of value added in agriculture, manufacturing, and services as regressors. The wage
outcome equation excludes state-level characteristics under the assumption that worker and
employer characteristics exhaustively predict earnings.
Table 6 presents the results from maximum likelihood estimation. Column (1) reports
selectivity-corrected coecients for our baseline specication. All regressors in the outcome
(wage) equation are highly signicant and exhibit the expected sign.9 Worker-specic
variables in the migration equation are highly signicant and corroborate the evidence from
section 3.4: women are less likely to migrate than men; workers with at least some college
are more likely to migrate than less-educated workers; migration is decreasing in age. State-
level information is also largely consistent with the literature: the higher is the state's
urbanization rate, log state-average wages, and the state's log value added in agriculture
and manufacturing, the less likely is a worker to migrate. Interestingly, GDP per capita at t
correlates signicantly positively with migration. A worker is more likely to migrate within
the formal sector if he resides in a high income state, in contrast to common priors. This
result, however, does not necessarily run contrary to commonly found regional migration
patterns: states like Goias often attract workers from states with higher per capita GDP,
such as Minas Gerais and the capital city (Distrito Federal). Similarly, many migrants
9Women earn 41 per cent less than men; wages are increasing in the level of education and increasing
with age, at a decreasing rate.
20Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of selectivity-corrected wage coecients
Dependent variable: log wages in t + 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.408** -0.417** -0.250** -0.192**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
High school graduate 0.463** 0.445** 0.223** 0.223**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Some college 1.183** 1.152** 0.592** 0.527**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022)
College graduate 1.640** 1.610** 0.932** 0.894**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Age at t + 1 0.065** 0.066** 0.033** 0.027**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age at t + 1 squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.0003** -0.0002**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) Selection equation: migrate
Female -0.337** -0.337** -0.335** -0.334**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High school graduate -0.017* -0.017* -0.011 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Some college 0.132** 0.132** 0.142** 0.152**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
College graduate 0.087** 0.087** 0.095** 0.107**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age at t -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Urbanization at t -0.131** -0.131** -0.134** -0.136**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
GDP per capita at t 0.076** 0.076** 0.078** 0.077**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log average state wages at t -0.209** -0.209** -0.209** -0.202**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Log value added in agriculture at t -0.010** -0.010** -0.012** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log value added in manufacturing at t -0.097** -0.097** -0.095** -0.092**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log value added in services at t 0.050** 0.050** 0.049** 0.046**
Fixed eects: state at t + 1 YES YES YES
Establishment controls at t + 1 YES YES
Establishment controls at t YES
Number of observations 1,005,010 1,005,010 1,004,549 1,003,876
Note: Establishment controls include average wages, number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share of workers
in eight age groups, four education groups, and ve occupational groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes
signicance at 1 per cent level; * denotes signicance at 5 per cent level.
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample) and IBGE, 1997-2001.
21from S~ ao Paulo arrive in the neighboting state of Paran a, despite the lower per capita GDP.
The sign is also consistent with the economic rationale that skilled formal sector emigrants
from high-income states may expect to nd formal sector jobs with steeper or more certain
wage paths at employers in lower-income states. Column (2) includes controls for state-level
dummies.
We augment our baseline specication to include employer-level controls both before
and after the migration decision. Identication of the selectivity-corrected coecients
in column (2) derives from the excluded state-level sectoral compositions in the outcome
equation. By including employer-level information, these state-level characteristics arguably
matter less for wage determination, but are still important factors for migration. Column (3)
presents results with employer controls after the migration decision in the outcome equation,
and the specication in column (4) also includes establishment controls before the migration
decision in the outcome equation. Establishment controls are average log wages, the log
number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share of workers in six age groups,
four education groups, and ve occupational groups.
In our preferred specication with employer controls before and after the migration
decision (column 4), all regressors in the wage equation are still highly signicant and
exhibit the expected sign. After inclusion of employer-level information, the bias-corrected
coecients on the individual characteristics move towards zero as expected. Meanwhile,
coecients in the selection equation have changed minimally. The omitted results on
employer-level controls in the outcome equation (not reported) are consistent with priors|
employment at an establishment with higher average wages both before and after migration
is positively correlated with a worker's wages.
We predict bias-corrected wages for workers in all 27 Brazilian states as migrants and
stayers with the coecient estimates from column (4) of Table 6. We follow the Dahl (2002)
methodology that extends Roy (1951) to multichoice migration decisions by grouping workers
with similar characteristics into worker cells. We dene cells by eight age categories10, two
gender categories, and four education categories.11 Our so transformed data set includes
10Child (10-14 yrs.), youth (15-17 yrs.), adolescent (18-24 yrs.), nascent career (25-29 yrs.), early career
(30-39 yrs.), peak career (40-49 yrs.), late career (50-64 yrs.), and post-retirement (65+).
11Primary school (grade 8 or less), high school graduate (grade 9-12), college dropout, college graduate.
22135,044 cells with an average of 187 workers per cell.
We generate a matrix of migration probabilities calculated for each state s as the fraction
of workers in the cell who migrate from state s to state m in year t. We then adapt equation 2
to include Mcsm, the probability that a worker from cell c migrates from state s to state m,
as follows
Mcsm = 0 + 1[^ Ycm   ^ Ycs] + 2Xc + 3Zs + cms (3)
where c denotes the 135,044 cells, ^ Ycm and ^ Ycs are computed as the cell-average of the
bias-corrected predicted wages from the Heckman (1979) selectivity correction for migrants
and stayers, Xc includes cell characteristics (gender, age, educational attainment), and Zs
includes state-level characteristics.
For the purpose of this study on the relationship between formal sector migration
and recent market-oriented policy reforms in Brazil, our main specication augments
equation (3), such that Xc includes cell-average employer characteristics. For instance,
our analysis relates the following predictors to cell c's probability of migration: the share
of workers in cell c employed at a foreign owned establishment, the share of workers in cell
c employed at an exporting establishment, and the cell-average establishment-level tenure-
wage prole. We measure the tenure-wage prole as the gradient between establishment-
average wages for workers with less than a year of tenure and establishment-average wages
for workers with 30 years of tenure. We also augment the vector Zs to include state-level
globalization-related characteristics, such as the state share of foreign owned establishments,
the state share of exporting establishments, state-level log of exports, and state-level log of
imports, as additional regressors. The latter exports and imports regressors serve as controls
for a location's exposure to global competition.
4.3 Globalization and formal sector migration
Table 7 reports results from ordinary least squares estimation of equation (3). We regress
worker cell migration probabilities on cell characteristics and state characteristics, pooling
the migration probabilities of all cells from all states s to all states m. All regressions are
weighted by the number of workers in each cell and standard errors are clustered at the
23emigration-state-level to account for spatial correlation of errors.
Column (1) reports estimation results for a simple model in which interstate wage
dierentials and worker characteristics may be related to the migration decision. The result,
after controlling for worker characteristics like gender, age, and educational attainment, and
using selectivity-corrected wage dierentials, suggests that interstate wage dierentials are
positively correlated with a worker's decision to migrate. A one percentage point increase
in the spot wage dierential is associated with a 0.2 per cent increase in the probability
of cross-state migration. The remaining cell-specic variables are highly signicant and
corroborate the evidence from section 3.4: women are less likely to migrate than men, while
the probability of migration is increasing in the level of education and decreasing in age.
In column (2), we add emigration-state xed eects, emigration-state time-varying controls,
and emigration-establishment controls, including the cell-average establishment-level 30-year
tenure-wage prole. The expectation of higher future wages in the current establishment
signicantly reduces the likelihood of migration, and the interstate wage dierential remains
signicantly positively correlated with the migration frequency.
Specication (3) introduces employer characteristics related to globalization, including
the share of the cell employed in a foreign owned establishment and the share of the cell
employed in an exporting establishment. Employment at a multinational rm is not
statistically signicantly associated with migration. But results suggest that employment
at an exporting establishment is negatively related to internal migration. A one standard
deviation (approximately 10 percentage points) increase in the share of the cells employed at
exporting establishments is associated with a 3 percentage point decrease in the probability
of migration. This nding is consistent with the idea that the business success of exporting
establishments informs workers' migration decisions.
Including state-level controls related to globalization in column (4) oers similar
conclusions. The share of the cell employed at an exporting establishment remains negatively
correlated with the probability of migration. Controlling for the share of exporting
establishments in the state, an increase in the share of the cell employed at an exporting
establishment of ten percentage points (one standard deviation) relates to a 2 percentage
point decrease in the probability of migration.
24Table 7: Formal sector migration in Brazil
Dependent variable: migration probability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Job characteristics
Predicted wage di. (^ Ycm   ^ Ycs) 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006)
Employer characteristics
Tenure-wage prole in t -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Tenure-wage prole in t + 1 0.001
(0.005)
Employed in a foreign establ. in t 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed in a foreign establ. in t + 1 0.002
(0.001)
Employed in an exporting establ. in t -0.003** -0.002** -0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Employed in an exporting establ. in t + 1 -0.003**
(0.001)
State characteristics related to globalization
Share of foreign establishments in t 0.004 -0.010
(0.013) (0.024)
Share of foreign establishments in t + 1 0.175*
(0.072)
Share of exporting establishments in t -0.023 -0.040
(0.040) (0.056)
Share of exporting establishments in t + 1 -0.059**
(0.016)
Worker controls YES YES YES YES YES
Emigration-establishment controls YES YES YES YES
Emigration-state xed eects YES YES YES YES
Emigration-state controls YES YES YES YES
Immigration-establishment controls YES
Immigration-state controls YES
Number of observations 135,044 103,688 103,688 103,688 102,570
Note: Worker cells formed by eight age, two gender, and four educational-attainment categories. State-level controls include
urbanization rates, GDP per capita, average state wages, value added from agriculture, services, and manufacturing, exports
and imports. Establishment controls include average wages, number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share of
workers in eight age groups, four education groups, and ve occupational groups. Regressions are weighted by cell size. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state-level, in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at 1 per cent level; * denotes signicance
at 5 per cent level.
Sources: RAIS (one per cent random sample), IBGE, RDE-IED, and SECEX, 1997-2001.
25Descriptive evidence in Table 4 shows that workers at exporters and multinational
enterprises are markedly more likely to move to another exporter or multinational enterprise,
when changing jobs, than workers at non-exporters or domestic establishments. A
concern is therefore that omitting variables related to the worker's employment and
location after migration could drive results in columns (1) through (4). We address the
concern by including variables for the immigration state and immigration establishment in
specication (5).12 Employment at an exporting establishment in the initial year continues
to be negatively related to internal migration, and similar in magnitude, though it loses
signicance. Migration is signicantly negatively related to employment at an exporter after
the migration decision and the share of exporters at the immigration location. These results
are in line with evidence in Table 4 that non-migrants with a job change more often nd re-
employment at exporting establishments than migrants. Migration is signicantly positively
related with a larger share of multinational enterprises at the immigration location, however.
A ten per cent increase in the concentration of foreign owned establishments at potential
immigration locations is associated with a 1.8 percentage point increase in the migration rate.
This result is consistent with the idea that locations that attract multinational enterprises
are also economically appealing locations for internal formal sector migrants.
The results of our multivariate analysis, as well as the descriptive ndings in section 3.4,
provide support for the idea that globalization acts on internal migration through the
growth of employment opportunities at locations with a high concentration of foreign
owned establishments and the stability of employment at exporting establishments:13 a ten
percentage point increase in exporter employment relates to a 2 percentage point reduced
probability of migration, and a ten per cent increase in the concentration of foreign owned
establishments at potential immigration locations relates to an about equal-sized increase in
the migration rate. The importance of the presence of foreign owned establishments in the
immigration region, beyond the spot wage, is consistent with the economic rationale that
migrants can expect benets beyond the spot wage dierential, such as steeper wage paths
12A more rigorous treatment of immigration-employer and immigration-state predictors would require
estimation of dierences in emigration-immigration characteristics similar to the two-step approach for spot
wages. The derivation and implementation of an according statistical model remains a task for future
research.
13Results from regressions by region (not reported) illustrate these points further.
26at foreign owned establishments (Figure 3) or more favourable labour-market conditions in
areas where multinational enterprises locate. The magnitudes of the migration ow changes,
predicted by exporter employment and the concentration of foreign owned establishments at
the destination location, are potentially large, given an annual overall migration rate of only
two per cent.
5 Concluding remarks
This chapter investigates how factors related to globalization are associated with internal
migration ows in a developing country. Using a novel matched data set of workers and
their establishments across all states of Brazil, we show that formal sector internal migration
ows are positively related to a high concentration of foreign owned establishments at the
destination location, while workers with employment at exporting establishments are less
likely to migrate. Our estimation approach corrects for self-selection of migrants and
controls for interstate wage dierentials as well as worker and state characteristics. Rigorous
identication strategies for the causal eects that destination-locations characteristics
exert on migration ows are beyond the scope of this descriptive paper, however. A
potentially fruitful path for analysis is the estimation of dierences in emigration-immigration
characteristics similar to our two-step approach for spot wages, based on Dahl (2002). The
derivation and implementation of an according statistical model remains a task for future
research.
Findings of our descriptive analysis are consistent with the idea that globalization acts
on internal migration through the growth of foreign owned establishments and employment
opportunities beyond spot wage dierentials and the stability of employment at exporting
establishments. Given annual formal sector migration rates of around two per cent, the
magnitude of globalization-predicted migration ows are potentially large. A one percentage
point increase in exporter employment is associated with a 0.2 percentage point reduced
probability of migration, and a one per cent increase in the concentration of foreign owned
establishments at potential migration destinations relates to an about equal-sized increase
in the migration rate.
27Recent research advances the hypothesis that return migration may be a leading cause
of the large and unprecedented ows of people from Southern to Northern regions in Brazil
(see Fiess and Verner (2002) for a discussion and an opposing view based on evidence from
a household cross section). Our ndings support the view that the frequent location of
foreign owned and exporting establishments in the Northern and Northeastern states may
be a reason for return migration from the South and Southeast.
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